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The EU Arms Embargo against China:  
Should Europe Play a Role in East Asian Security? 
 
Frans Paul van der Putten 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Europe and East Asia are highly interdependent through their 
extensive mutual trade and investment relations, but also because 
the European Union (EU), China, and Japan are major actors on 
international forums such as the United Nations (UN) and the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). While Europe has a stable 
regional security system – the main component of which is the 
EU – this is not the case in East Asia. The lack of a dependable 
security mechanism to deal with potential East Asian flashpoints 
such as the ‘Taiwan issue’ has a destabilising effect on Europe’s 
economic and security interests. Clearly, Europe would benefit 
from a strengthening of stability in East Asia. The main argument 
in this paper is that the EU should strive to assume a degree of 
responsibility for East Asian security that corresponds with its 
interests. The EU arms embargo against China serves as an 
illustration both of the need for the EU to take more responsibility 
for East Asian security, and of the ways in which a more active 
role might be pursued. 
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Interests versus Influence  
The EU has major interests in East Asian security. In the first place, 
trade and investment relations between Europe and China, Taiwan, 
Japan, Hong Kong, and South Korea are extensive. However 
important the economic role of the United States (US) may be, it 
cannot replace East Asia’s role in the world economy. Economic 
growth rates and labour costs are more attractive in Asia, while the 
US offers a huge high-end market and abundant technology. 
Europe simply needs both these economic partner regions. A 
collapse of East Asian stability would negatively affect trade and 
investment ties with Europe. 
 
The second major interest in East Asian security lies in the 
effectiveness of multilateral institutions. A major international 
conflict in East Asia would probably involve the US, China, and 
Japan. These countries play crucial roles in global institutions like 
the UN and the WTO. The US and China are permanent members 
of the UN Security Council, while the US and Japan are important 
members of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). The European-American relationship within North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) could also be affected if the 
Americans engage in an East Asian conflict. The EU, not being a 
global military power, depends on all of these multinational 
institutions for its external security. 
 
While Europe’s interests in East Asian security are 
considerable, its influence in this area is very limited. The EU, like 
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the US, is a dialogue partner of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), 
the only ‘security forum’ for Southeast and East Asia. However, 
the scope of the EU’s influence in the ARF is mainly limited to 
issues of human security, which focuses on the protection of 
individuals from violence and is closely associated with a human 
rights approach. 1  Moreover, not even the ARF itself plays a 
significant role in the fundamental issue underlying security in 
East Asia: stability between China, Japan and the United States.   
 
There are a number of more localised international security 
issues within the region, such as North Korea’s foreign relations, 
China-Taiwan relations, and maritime disputes in the East China 
Sea. Only in the case of North Korea has the EU played a role. In 
the 1990s it co-financed the Korean Peninsula Energy 
Development Organisation (KEDO), which was established in 1994 
under the international agreement to limit North Korea’s 
capability to produce nuclear weapons. This financial involvement 
came about at the initiative of Japan, and was a return gesture for 
Japan’s support for reconstruction efforts in the Balkans.2 However, 
the EU is not an influential actor in relation to North Korea and it 
does not take part in the Six Party Talks, the negotiations on the 
future of North Korea’s nuclear programme.   
 
 
The Arms Embargo against China 
The European Union imposed the arms embargo against China in 
the wake of the violent suppression of the pro-democracy 
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movement in Tiananmen Square in Beijing on 4 June 1989. The 
purpose was to put pressure on the Chinese government to end 
‘repressive actions against those who legitimately claim their 
democratic rights.’3 While the arms embargo was initially aimed at 
ending the prosecution of pro-democracy activists, there now is 
disagreement between the EU’s 27 member states on which terms 
the embargo should end. The current outlook is that a number of 
human rights and security elements need to be in place before 
consensus on ending the embargo can be reached. With regard to 
human rights, Commissioner for External Affairs Ferrero-Waldner 
identified the following points of attention: Beijing’s ratification of 
the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 
release of all persons imprisoned because of their involvement in 
the 1989 demonstrations, and the abolition of the ‘reeducation 
through labour’ system.4  These are not formally conditions for 
lifting the embargo, but their implementation would be seen by 
the Commission as encouraging signs of Beijing’s human rights 
policy. With regard to security, lifting the embargo should not 
endanger stability in Chinese-Taiwanese relations or the security 
of the EU’s allies. 
 
In the past few years France has been arguing strongly in 
favour of ending the embargo. Debates in the European Council 
since 2004 have brought to light major differences of opinion 
between the member states. Public statements from the EU in late 
2004 and early 2005 that the embargo would be lifted in the near 
future attracted strong attention not only from China but also from 
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the US and Japan.5 China regards the embargo as an impediment 
to good relations and accepts only an unconditional ending of the 
embargo.67  However, the US, Europe’s main security ally, and 
Japan strongly urged the EU to keep the embargo in place. The 
current impasse in the EU’s decision-making on the embargo is 
harmful in several ways.8 In the first place, the continued display 
of dissent within the Union on this issue reveals its weakness and 
indecisiveness in its external relations. In the second place, the 
unresolved matter plays a negative role in EU-US relations. 
Washington has made it very clear that an end to the embargo is 
unacceptable, because of both human rights and security reasons. 
The EU can not go back on its statements that it is working 
towards ending the embargo without affecting its credibility and 
its relations with China, and staying in the current stalemate is 
highly unfavourable. The only option for the EU is to move ahead 
and find a way to end the embargo.  
 
The approach of the EU towards ending the embargo takes 
place on two levels. On one level, China is being encouraged to 
take human rights measures such as mentioned by Ferrero-
Waldner, to refrain from explicitly threatening the use of force 
against Taiwan, and to reassure the United States by making the 
Chinese military build-up program more transparent. On another 
level, the EU is upgrading its Code of Conduct for arms exports. It 
is also developing a so-called ‘toolbox’ for its arms export policy to 
cope specifically with exports to currently embargoed countries 
such as China. The new Code of Conduct and the toolbox are 
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intended to guarantee that arms exports to China are subjected to 
human rights and security conditions, so that the act itself of lifting 
the embargo does not imply any quantitative or qualitative 
increase in exports. The EU has announced that an end to the arms 
embargo will only happen in conjuncture with these improved 
export controls.9  
 
 
Security Themes in the Embargo Debate 
Although human rights play a major part in the controversy, this 
paper will focus only on those problems in the arms embargo 
debate that relate to international security. A solution will have to 
be found in both areas, but it is the security dimension that relates 
directly to the question of the EU’s role in East Asian security. We 
will take a closer look at the two security themes in the debate: 
stability in China-Taiwan relations and the security of the EU’s 
allies. 
 
First, China is very concerned that Taiwan will gain formal 
independence. Preventing this is China’s foremost security 
objective. On 14 March 2005 China’s so-called anti-secession law 
went into effect. This law declared that China would, as a final 
resort, employ non-peaceful means to prevent Taiwan from 
declaring independence. An extensive study by the International 
Crisis Group in 2003 states that in the current decade, China lacks 
the military power to enforce an effective blockade of Taiwan and 
it is not militarily strong enough to achieve the goal of 
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reunification without sacrificing its fast-growing economy. 10 
Nevertheless, each year China’s defence expenditure grows 
significantly. Military capabilities and the perception thereof play 
a pivotal role in the relationship between China and Taiwan. 
When China adopted its anti-secession law, concerns were voiced 
in the European Parliament that linked the embargo with Sino-
Taiwanese relations. 11  These concerns are that an end to the 
embargo could either increase the likelihood that China uses force 
or induce an increased arms race across the Taiwan Strait.  
 
Second, there is also a concern that lifting the embargo could 
harm the security interests of some of the EU’s allies, in particular 
to the United States and Japan. Pressure from these two countries, 
especially from the US, plays an important role in this respect. The 
United States is the EU’s main security ally. The relationship 
between China and Taiwan is crucial in the American perception 
of the embargo. As President George W. Bush stated, ‘there is a 
deep concern in our country that a transfer of weapons would be a 
transfer of technology to China, which would change the balance 
of relations between China and Taiwan, and that is of concern.’12   
 
The Taiwan Relations Act, which dates from 1979, requires 
the US government to maintain the status quo across the Taiwan 
Strait by arming Taiwan and by stationing substantial military 
forces in Japan. In 2001, the Bush administration began move 
towards a full military alliance with Taiwan.13 In the same year the 
United States military created the Operations Plan 5077 for the 
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defence of Taiwan. This plan includes such options as maritime 
intercept operations and attacking targets in Mainland China, 
while the use of nuclear weapons is not ruled out.14 Meanwhile, 
the Bush administration upgraded its military alliance with Japan 
and increased its military cooperation with the Philippines. All 
these policies were in part to ensure that America’s Pacific-based 
forces would be strong enough to contain a Chinese military attack 
on Taiwan.15  
 
According to the International Crisis Group, ‘because a low-
level attack – or the use of significant non-military coercive 
measures – cannot be excluded, the risk of was across the Taiwan 
Strait has to be taken seriously.’16  Should a Chinese-Taiwanese 
military conflict break out, then there is a risk that United States 
becomes involved.17 The US military takes the risk of a war with 
China over Taiwan seriously. This is perhaps the most important 
reason why the US government opposes its European allies to lift 
the arms embargo.18 The American government has warned the 
EU that if the embargo is lifted, America may reduce the export of 
its military technology to Europe and reconsider the existing 
transatlantic military relations.19  
 
America’s most important ally in Asia, Japan, has also put 
pressure on the EU to retain the embargo.20 Although Japan has no 
security commitment to Taiwan, it is the most important military 
ally of the United States in Asia. Japan acts as the main regional 
base for America’s military presence in East Asia, and is a 
The EU Arms Embargo against China 
9 
neighbour to Taiwan. Obviously increased tensions between China 
and Taiwan, or between China and the US would also affect 
Japan’s security. 
 
An important question is to what extent the arms embargo 
actually affects China’s military capabilities. In principle, the 
embargo makes it more difficult for Beijing to obtain European-
made weapons and military technology. This has an impact on the 
development of China’s military strategy. The embargo is not the 
only policy on weapons exports at the EU level that potentially 
affects China. Since the early 1990s, the EU has issued criteria for 
arms exports by its member states.21 In 1998 these criteria were 
incorporated into the above-mentioned Code of Conduct. 
Although the code is not legally binding, the implication is that 
even if the EU would lift the arms embargo against China, there is 
still a potential obstacle for Beijing to purchase weaponry from 
Europe. The criteria laid out in the existing code have already 
precluded the sale of weapons if they could be used to repress a 
country’s own population (criterion 2a), or to act ‘aggressively 
against another country or to assert by force a territorial claim’ 
(criterion 4). In 1995, the European Council also implemented a 
law to control the transfer of civilian technology with a potential 
for military purposes, so-called dual use goods. 22  Finally, the 
individual member states also have their own regulation on arms 
exports. 
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In practice, however, the arms embargo and the other export 
limitations only have a limited impact on the transfer of militarily 
relevant technology between China and Europe. 23  Since 1989, 
several European countries have sold arms to China. France, Italy 
and Britain are currently the largest arms exporters to China 
within the EU. In 2003, the total value of arms exports licensed by 
the EU countries was 416 million Euros.24  
 
Russia is China’s main arms supplier, selling advanced 
hardware such as aircraft and submarines. 25  What China is 
interested in buying from Europe are specific niche technologies 
such as radar, air-to-air missiles, sonar equipment, torpedoes, and 
C4ISR (command and control, communications, computers, 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) equipment.26 Some 
of the technologies involved can be obtained today as dual-use 
goods. Nonetheless, the lifting of export restrictions by the EU will 
increase competitive pressure on international arms sellers – 
especially Russia - which will benefit China as a buyer. Moreover, 
the EU’s claim that an end to the embargo will not result in more 
arms sales to China is widely doubted.27 European arms dealers 
and the manufacturers of dual-use goods are expected to put 
strong pressure on their governments to allow more exports once 
the embargo is gone.28  
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Security Risks of Lifting the Embargo 
With regard to the security dimension of the embargo, there is a 
great risk that lifting it will damage Europe’s relation with the US. 
So far the Americans have expressed little faith in the value of the 
revised export policy - or in the willingness of countries such as 
France to uphold this policy - and the warnings from the US that 
the embargo should not be lifted have been very clear. Addressing 
the risk of damaged transatlantic relations takes more than a 
public relations campaign to promote the revised export code in 
Washington. Rather it is necessary to look at the fundamental 
elements in the embargo’s security relevance.  
 
The two crucial underlying elements are the EU’s capacity to 
provide modern weapons technology and the EU’s security 
relationship with the United States. First, modern weapons 
technology is the thing that China wants and that the US does not 
want China to have. Various EU countries are willing to supply 
such technology – under certain restrictions – because they are 
doing so even under the embargo. Second, it is the future of the 
transatlantic security alliance that is at stake in the debate over the 
arms embargo between Washington and Brussels.  
 
Neither China nor the US appears inclined to involve the EU 
as an active participant in East Asian security, even though they 
expect Europe to adapt its arms exports policy to their respective – 
mutually conflicting - security interests. China’s position is that the 
embargo is a matter of political discrimination and that the Taiwan 
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issue as an internal Chinese affair. The American position is that 
its security role in East Asia is for the common benefit of all of its 
allies, especially Europe with its extensive economic interests in 
the region. Since the Europeans do not have the capabilities to 
contribute to the US effort in East Asia to protect security, the 
Americans do not accept significant European influence in this 
area. 
 
If the EU maintains its ad hoc, introspective, and minimalist 
attitude towards the arms embargo – and to East Asian security - it 
will not escape the risk of damaging its external relations. Because 
of their weapons technology and their security relationship with 
the US, the EU member countries have not only an interest but also 
a source of influence in East Asian security. Obviously the 
potential to exert influence remains limited, but a better balance 
between interests and influence is possible. In other words, the EU 
should take more responsibility for East Asian security. If Europe 
plays an active role in influencing the context in which its arms 
technology is employed and if it shoulders part of the burden of 
upholding regional security, it will acquire more freedom of action 
it to deal with the arms embargo. This is a complicated approach, 
but it surely is the less harmful way to solve the embargo as well 
as other security issues that will come up EU-East Asian relations.  
 
To attain an active and responsible role in East Asian 
security that is relevant to the arms embargo, two initiatives seem 
appropriate. One is contribute to establishing a regional security 
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forum aimed at arms control. Military modernisation in Asia 
should be directed towards more international security, not result 
in a destabilising arms race. The EU, having a large defence 
industry, has a strong incentive and strong arguments to be 
involved in such a forum. The other initiative the EU could take is 
to contribute to international cooperation in maritime security. As 
stated by Paul Kennedy, Europe is largely absent from the 
protection of the two most important maritime trade routes of the 
twenty-firs century, namely the sea lanes between the Persian Gulf 
and East Asia, and those across the Pacific.29  Europe, with its 
dependence on international trade, has a strong interest in the 
protection of these sea lanes. Committing European naval 
resources to maritime security in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific 
would increase the legitimacy of a European voice in Asian 
security debates. A greater European role in international security 
would also help make the transatlantic security relationship more 
balanced, which would create more space within this relationship 
for Europe’s China policy. 
 
 
Conclusion 
The issue of the arms embargo against China symbolises the 
overall position of the EU towards security in East Asia. What it 
shows is that even though Europe’s influence in security matters in 
the region is limited in the context of its extensive interests, the EU 
could and should do more than it currently does. The problems 
which the EU currently faces with regard to the embargo should 
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be seen in the context of Europe’s role in international security. 
The root cause of these problems is that Europe takes insufficient 
responsibility for security in a strategically important region. The 
solution therefore would be assuming a larger degree of 
responsibility in Asian security. The aim is not so much 
eliminating the arms embargo issue, but to address the more 
serious matter underlying this issue, namely the future of Europe’s 
security relations with the US and East Asia.  
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